Risk Intelligence has noted increased attention in Asia on the activities of the dark fleet, as the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) at Singapore’s Changi Naval Base detected a significant level of AIS spoofing.
Activity associated with the dark fleet had been identified in the form of a spate of AIS spoofing cases brought to light by Singapore’s IFC. During the second half of September the IFC detected more than a dozen potential AIS spoofing activities, all involving tankers situated in the lower South China Sea off Malaysia’s Johor peninsula.
When this was added to the use of scrapped vessels’ details in some AIS broadcasts, there was little doubt that the operators of the ships involved were seeking to conceal their real identities.
Risk Intelligence observed that, while such practices were used as a means to conceal engagement in the transport of sanctioned oil or other refined products, there was significant concern on two fronts; Firstly, the impact on safe navigation, as illustrated by the collision in July involving the tankers Hafnia Nile and Ceres I. The Ceres I has been described by some as a “serial spoofer”. It was thought that this might have contributed to the July collision.
There was also an impact on ‘live’ vessels whose details were cloned by the spoofers. This could cause the owners and operators of law abiding vessels problems with flags, insurers, bankers and governments.
Risk Intelligence said that the latest AIS spoofing activity emphasized the urgency of the IMO’s efforts to identify and enact regulations aimed at the enhancement of AIS information security to prevent manipulation of AIS transmissions and tampering with AIS transponders.
Asia had been relatively quiet in the past few years when it came to full-on piracy. The majority of attacks on vessels had been low-level burglary of vessels in the strait of Singapore or when vessels are at anchorage or moored at port – rather than piracy on the High Seas. Bulk carriers and tankers are the most targeted vessel types during Singapore Strait transits. Container vessels, heavy lift ships and offshore support vessels generally experience thefts and armed robberies while at anchorage areas.
However, on September 24th there was a hijacking of a tug and barge in the Java Sea. The unit was on a domestic Indonesian voyage, transporting biofuel from Kalimantan to Bali. Attackers took command of the tug and barge and initiated an STS operation, transferring the biofuel cargo from the barge to a tanker alongside. This took 10 hours. Prior to departing, the attackers took equipment and supplies, cash and crew belongings. They also destroyed the communications and navigational equipment.
Enquiries into this incident with the Indonesian Ministry of Transport revealed that a different tug was attacked on February 2nd in an almost identical fashion, although that previous incident lasted for 27 hours. The crews were unharmed in both incidents.
There had been only four hi-jacking in south-east Asia in the previous five years. Larger cargo ships operating on international voyages have not been targeted.
There was no kidnap for ransom activity currently taking place in the region.